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Political Context, Conceptual Framework
Pierre Beckouche
Abstract This chapter highlights the context of the neighbourhoods issue. This is an
uneasy one, because globalisation has become a dominant paradigm. What need
would then scientists and decision-makers have to pay attention to neighbours, when
the global world is at stake and within reach? Yet, we give the factors that explain the
rise of the regionalisation –i.e. the neighbourhoods– issue, as a complementary
pattern, along with the “globalisation” pattern, of the internationalisation of human
activities in the last four decades. We also explain why this issue is poorly addressed
in scientiﬁc literature in particular in Europe. Indeed, the EU is the most advanced
experience of regional integration worldwide. But for many reasons, it overlooks
relationships with its developing neighbour countries. We assume here that Europe
and its neighbours constitute one major region. Despite unrest and wars in these
neighbourhoods, we assume that they offer more opportunities than threats. We
provide a territorial analysis of these, showing the tough methodological challenges
we had to overcome when it comes to access to reliable data and geometries delin-
eation, which are indispensable if one wants to draw an overall vision of this region.
1.1 The Rise of the Neighbourhoods in the Regionalisation
Context
1.1.1 The Dialectic Between Globalisation
and Regionalisation
Three factors explain the rise of regionalisation—thus the neighbourhood—issue,
as a complementary major pattern, along with the “globalisation” pattern, of the
internationalisation of human activities in the four last decades. The ﬁrst factor is
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economic: in a knowledge economy, an increasing share of the resources are
decreasingly withdrawn to other players but rather produced with other players. The
bigger the interaction with players the larger the new resources. Thus, neighbouring
countries can more easily turn into strategic partners for business. The “neighbour”
gets a new status: it is decreasingly viewed as the historical military enemy and
increasingly becomes the necessary economic partner—see the new East Asian
policy of China, which, in the 1990s turned its regional strategy from confrontation
to partnership [Beeson and Li 2012].
The second factor is environmental: the rise of concerns regarding the climate and
natural resources has, of course, a global dimension (e.g. IPCC reports), but it also has
a regional dimension because dissemination of air or water pollution spreads to
neighbouring territories. The domain of the environment provides the most con-
vincing proof that proximity has not been dissolved in globalisation. Moreover, the
perspective of costlier long distance transport due to energy price increases, could
promote shorter supply chains, hence growing economic interaction with neighbours.
The third factor is political: the collapse of purely national regulation since the
1980s did not give way to alternative regulation at global scale. The recent failures
of global regulation in the ﬁnancial area (2008 international crisis), in the envi-
ronment area (2009 Copenhagen climate change conference), and in the trade area
(Doha round’s successive adjournments), have exposed a need for international
regulation on a regional scale, of which the European Union was a primary example.
The consequences of this rising interaction between regionalisation and glob-
alisation are threefold:
Fig. 1.1 The long-run trend of regional integration. The case of trade. Source: Comtrade,
ESPON TIGER & ITAN projects, FP7 Eurobroadmap Project, IGEAT, OMC, P.Beckouche
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(i) The rise of regionalism, that is the multiplication since the mid-1990s of
Regional trade agreements—which go much further than trade since they can
also deal with migration or environment. As reflected in the positions adopted
by the FAO and Unctad favouring regional agreements [Mashayekhi et al.
2005], the regionalisation of efforts to regulate environment, food security,
new North-South relations and international economic relations is more and
more viewed as a positive complement to global regulation.
(ii) The conﬁrmation of de facto regionalisation of migratory, cultural and eco-
nomic international exchanges. For decades, international trade has increased
more on the scale of large international regions than on the scale of the world
(Fig. 1.1). The story changed in the 2000s, due to the booming importance of a
new global player: China, but the long run regionalisation pattern remains
relevant. The advantages of regional cooperation are particularly high when it
associates neighbours of different levels of development with economic
complementarity: know-how and technology in the developed countries, rising
markets, labour forces and low economic costs in their developing neighbours
[Deblock and Regnault 2006]. Despite the globalisation of routes, foreigners
still mostly come from the neighbourhoods; in the USA, contrary to what is
often said due to the rapid growth of Asian newcomers, the bigger change over
the last half century has been the replacement of European in-migrants by
neighbour American in-migrants (Figs. 1.2 and 1.3).
(iii) What could be called the regionalisation of minds, that is to say the rising use of
international institutions and think tanks to ﬁgure out internationalisation
through the regional pattern. The World Bank works increasingly at a regional
scale: “East Asia and the Paciﬁc”, “Latin America”, “Middle East and North
Africa (Mena region)” etc., as an example, see its book with the Islamic
Fig. 1.2 Trade: the impressive rise of the East Asia regional integration. Source: ESPON Europe
in the World project, FP7 FP7 Eurobroadmap Project, IGEAT
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development bank on the Arab countries’ integration [CMI, WB and IDB
2012]. In 2011, the Asian development bank (ADB) published a report whose
signiﬁcant title is “Institutions for Regional Integration—Towards an Asian
Economic Community”; regional integration is one of its three strategic axes,
along with inclusive and sustainable growth. Likewise, the strategy of the
African development bank is now designed in a regional framework, as
expressed in the “AfDB Group Regional Integration Strategy”; in 2012 the
bank published a book very much in favour of a North African integration
[Santi et al. 2012]; since 2004 it has been associated with the UN Economic
commission for Africa in publishing a set of reports on African regional inte-
gration. The UNDP and the WTO also see the world in regions. The Institute
for the integration of Latin America (Intal) of the Inter-American development
bank publishes comparisons with other large world regions. The OECD pub-
lishes studies of the various regional integrations. Whereas it had come down
against any East Asian ﬁnancial cooperation during the 1997–1998 ﬁnancial
crisis and advocated for a sole global monetary fund, the IMF now regards the
regional issue positively. Its Finance & Development review recognises that
Fig. 1.3 Despite the globalisation of routes, foreigners mostly come from the neighbourhoods.
Source: IGEAT, World Bank & Bilateral Migration and Remittances, 2012
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“Done right, regional integration helps connect developing countries to world
markets” [Deichmann and Gill 2008]. Meaningfully, a rising number of large
companies choose a regionalised organisation of their world activities:
Americas, Europe (more and more “Europe-Middle East-Africa”), East Asia…
1.1.2 How the Neighbourhoods Issue Is Addressed
in International Scientiﬁc Literature…
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the regional issue has also been the target of a
huge rise in academic publishing. Things began as early as the 1960s when the
European Community came into force: the debate among economists dealt mainly
with the opportunity this community represented for fulﬁlling the ﬁve stages of any
regional integration according to the theory of Balassa [1961]: free trade area,
customs union, common market, economic and monetary union.
The main impetus for academic publishing came from the rise of Regional trade
agreements (RTAs) worldwide in the 1990s and what Hettne and Soderbaum
[2004] called the “new regionalism”. Contrary to the old regionalism that took place
in the 1950s and 1960s, this new regionalism is open to new membership and to
globalisation, has multidimensional objectives (politics, security, culture but above
all economics [Baldwin 1997]), and involves State but also market and civil society
actors in many institutional forms. In a recent book, De Lombaerde and Soderbaum
[2014] provide a comprehensive analysis of the regionalisation process in the six
last decades. However, the territorial issue remains largely overlooked.
1.1.3 … and in the EU Political Framework
For Europe, the territorial approach of regionalisation is a way to ease functional
integration with its neighbourhoods (transports, energy…), and its international
relations with its neighbours thanks to territorial cooperation—which is often easier
than diplomatic relations. Lastly, a territorial approach of regionalisation is a driver
to mobilise the rising civil society in the European neighbour countries (ENCs).
That is why the EU pays close attention to this neighbourhood issue in its strategic
papers. Cooperation with the neighbourhoods has long been a signiﬁcant matter for
the European Union. The rise of regional integration in America (Nafta) and eastern
Asia (Asean Plus Three: Japan, South Korea and China), the European need for
new markets since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis, the Arab spring and the
outburst of the regional crisis in Eastern Ukraine, have made this issue still more
relevant. A large set of EU policies draw a favourable context for a renewal of
European territorial actions related to neighbour countries:
– Launched in 2007, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, plus the
Strategic partnership with Russia) provides the general framework for cooper-
ation, security and free trade with the neighbourhoods deﬁned as the countries
sharing a border with EU.
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– Europe 2020 Strategy advocating smart, inclusive and sustainable growth, gives
a role to enlargement and regional integration with neighbouring countries: “The
Europe 2020 strategy (…) can also offer considerable potential to candidate
countries and our neighbourhood and better help anchor their own reform
efforts” [European Commission 2010, p. 23].
– The Cohesion Policy promotes cross-border and transnational cooperation and
macro-regions including neighbouring countries.
– The Territorial Agenda 2020 states that “cohesion at the external borders is
crucial, as disparities and differences in legal, social and political systems have
important consequences especially in terms of migration and trade” and that
“growing interdependence of regions generates demand for better connectivity”
[European Union 2011b, p. 5].
Nevertheless, the tools for a better cooperation with neighbouring territories are
to be improved. As the Territorial State and Perspective of the EU states, “the
current territorial cooperation system is composed of three loosely co-ordinated
blocks: territorial cooperation within the EU, territorial cooperation with neigh-
bouring, candidate and potential candidate countries, and cooperation with other
countries” [European Union 2011a p. 24]. This means that a comprehensive vision
of this large region that encompasses Europe and the neighbouring countries is
lacking. Rather, we have a juxtaposition of status, tools, programmes and visions.
Launched by the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries in 1995, the
Barcelona process itself is divided into an enormous number of programmes—
much closer to an impressionist painting than to a coherent strategy.
In its “Elements for a Common Strategic Framework 2014 to 2020”, the European
Commission [2013] paves the way for a better combination of its ﬁnancial funds for
cohesion, social, regional, rural andmaritime policies. It maintains the main EU goals
related to the neighbourhoods. TheEuropeanNeighbourhood Instrument (ENI,which
replaced the ENPI in January 2014) beneﬁts from a signiﬁcant increase when com-
pared to the budget of the previous ENPI instrument, with €18.2 billion for the period
2014–2020. Given the potential role of territorial cooperation, it is of utmost impor-
tance for the success of EUpolicies dedicated to the neighbourhoods to begin toﬁll the
gap of territorial knowledge on the two sides of the external European border.
1.2 Assumptions and Key Questions
1.2.1 Two Assumptions: “One Region”, “Greater
Opportunities than Threats”
Our ﬁrst assumption is that the European territory and its neighbourhoods are one
“region”. The EU and its neighbours have a number of cooperation agreements on
an intergovernmental scale down to the local cross-border local scale. Nevertheless,
it has to be said that these agreements are much less effective than the EU’s
discourse on the ENP would lead one to expect. Several studies have shown how
scattered the action taken by the Commission in the framework of the Barcelona
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process was for overall very limited ﬁnancial means—not to mention the almost
non-existent neighbourhood strategy of each EU member state.
Our second assumption is that this greater region shows greater opportunities
than threats. European neighbourhoods are all too often regarded with a simpliﬁed
view: great natural resources on the one hand, especially energy; migration pressure
and political unrest on the other hand. This atlas depicts a much more nuanced view
of both opportunities and threats, at national and at local scale: access to markets,
investment scarcity and potential, climate change and water shortage but also
opportunities for cooperation, cross-border trafﬁcking control but also cooperation,
etc. We acknowledge that the assessment of threats is underrepresented because we
do not deal with geopolitics.
1.2.2 Three Objectives
The atlas has three objectives. The ﬁrst objective is humble: bringing a compre-
hensive view of the neighbour territories to European stakeholders. It is a prelim-
inary step for any regional view of the greater European region. Otherwise
stakeholders would remain in today’s situation: a fragmented representation of the
various neighbourhoods, with large loopholes in the knowledge of these strategic
territories for Europe, and, all too often, fantasy rather than sound knowledge.
The second objective is assessing the regional integration between the Europe
and the neighbour countries, through a territorial analysis. Can we more and more
speak of “one greater region”? Do trends show convergence or divergence?
Convergence is increasing in the Northern neighbourhood, whereas divergence is
increasing in the Southern neighbourhood. In the case of the Western Balkans the
dominant trend is convergence rather than divergence, but the results of research
show a variety of degrees according to the country considered. The result of the
Eastern neighbourhood is highly complex, because Russia has resisted, in the last
decade, the reorientation of the Eastern neighbourhood’s economic geography
toward Europe that occurred in the 1990s, and recently managed to regain eco-
nomic, energetic and, thus, political influence upon its CIS neighbours.
The last objective is suggesting policy orientations in order to reduce risks and
foster opportunities throughout the regional integration.
1.2.3 What Do We Call “Neighbourhoods”?
The ESPON project “Europe in the world” had proposed a functional regional
breakdown of the world thanks to a wide range of economic, cultural and historical
indicators. In the European case, it designed a region encompassing Europe and its
neighbouring countries. Indeed the precise span of the “European region” varies
according to the chosen indicators but as a whole, this geographical ﬁgure conﬁrmed
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that countries surrounding Europe belong to the same large region [Grasland and
Didelon 2007]. The issue of theArabic peninsula and the PersianGulfwhich are in the
area of influence of several world poles, including Europe, remains unclear.
This atlas is based on the ofﬁcial list of neighbour countries according to the ENP,
but with some differences: (i) formally Turkey was, but is no longer, a “neighbour”
country since it became a “candidate” country in 2005. The same applies to the
candidate countries of the Western Balkans: the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, which are, nevertheless, regarded as “neigh-
bours” in this atlas. (ii) The Caucasian countries (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan)
are taken into account but only at a national scale, with no infra-national data and
mapping. (iii) The atlas encompasses the Faroe Islands and Greenland as neigh-
bouring countries of theNorthern Periphery Programme and theNorthernDimension.
Our choice of considering actual and recent European neighbour countries,
should not make us forget that other groupings exist in the area. Not the least of
these groupings is the Community of independent states (CIS) which is being
reinforced by a Eurasian custom union driven by Russia, which Ukraine recently
decided to join under very contentious circumstances, provoking political unrest
since the beginning of 2014. In the Mediterranean also, in line with the background
of rising South-South trade and investment flows, other alternatives are offered to
the Arab countries, on the scale of the Arab Maghreb Union or on the scale of a
pan-Arab agreement (Greater Arab free trade agreement, GAFTA). For Europe,
there is less motivation given that some neighbour countries have not yet negotiated
any Association agreement or Action plan (see Syria, Libya and Belarus on
Map 1.2 [Beckouche and Richard 2013]). Turkey considers the Union for the
Mediterranean as a diversion of the membership issue, and develops its own
sub-regional strategy with the Middle-East and the countries with Turkish-speaking
populations of central Asia (a “ﬁve seas strategy” from Caspian to Black, Aegean,
Mediterranean and Red Seas).
Sticking to a strict deﬁnition of the “neighbourhood”, we do not cover the central
and eastern parts of Russia nor Europe overseas’ American neighbours. The present
neighbourhoods are, therefore:
– Northern neighbourhood: the Faroe Islands and Greenland (to Denmark), and
not Iceland because this country is an ESPON member. The Faroe Islands and
Greenland are self-governing overseas administrative divisions of the Kingdom
of Denmark, but, unlike Denmark, they are not members of the European Union
or ESPON.
– Eastern neighbourhood: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia (every oblast
from the western boundaries to the Ural Mountains which is the conventional
limit of European Russia). Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are covered on a
national scale.
– South-Eastern neighbourhood, i.e. Western Balkans: Croatia (because it joined
the EU after the beginning of the ITAN project), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia,
Montenegro, Kosovo, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Fyrom)
and Albania.
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– Southern, i.e. Mediterranean, neighbourhood: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Jordan, the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), Israel, Lebanon, Syria
and Turkey.
Our area covers territories that are politically disputed: Abkhazia (vis-à-vis
Georgia); South Ossetia (vis-à-vis Georgia); Transnistria (vis-à-vis the Republic of
Moldova); the Golan Heights (between Israel and Syria); the Hala’ib triangle
(between Egypt and Sudan). We followed the EU statements to be able to properly
display these territories on maps, though there is no statement on the Hala’ib
Triangle claimed by Egypt and Sudan. The Western Sahara issue was difﬁcult to
address: the UN cartography does not encompass it within the Moroccan national
territory—whereas Morocco is certainly the Mediterranean country the most thor-
oughly involved in the partnership with the EU (Maps 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3).
Map 1.1 A proliferation of sub-regional organisations in the greater European region
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1.3 Methodological Challenges in Unstable Territories
1.3.1 The Difﬁcult Geometries Issue
As the goal is to create an integrated geography EU + neighbourhoods, we have set
up “similar to NUTS” geometries throughout all the neighbourhoods, that is to say
territorial delineation stemming from administrative local divisions (oblast in Russia,
governorates or provinces in many Arab countries, etc.) and comparable to the
European NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, that is to say the
ofﬁcial subdivisions of EU countries for statistical purposes). As a ﬁrst step, our
Map 1.2 Contractual relations between the EU and the neighbour countries
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targeted scale is the equivalent of European NUTS 2 or 3 (Regions, Départements,
Länder…). That means that we could not reduce the scale, thus we could not address
the urban issue, since it would have required data collection on a very local scale.
Another shortcoming is that several neighbour countries have recently experi-
enced major unrest and even wars such as the Lebanon civil war (1975–1990), the
two Intifadas (1987 and 2000, the current situation being close to a permanent
guerrilla conflict between Israel and the Palestinians), the breaking up of the former
USSR in 1991. Various unrests followed the latter: in Transnistria (1992 war),
Chechnya (wars from 1994 to 2000, maybe 200,000 deaths), Georgia (armed
conflict in August 2008 with Russia and the separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia),
Ukraine (on-going crisis which started after the unsuccessful Eastern Partnership
Summit of November 2013). The former Yugoslavian wars lasted from 1991 to
Map 1.3 The atlas’ four neighbourhoods
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2001, and caused between 200,000 and 300,000 deaths and one million displaced
people.
Since January 2011 the Arab spring has affected all the Mediterranean neigh-
bours, in particular:
– Tunisia, where it ﬁrst broke out, and Egypt where the revolution caused at least
500 deaths and where a civil war is not at stake but is not completely impossible.
– Libya where the civil war, from February to October 2011, caused around
30,000 deaths and provoked the outmigration of hundreds of thousands, maybe
millions, into the neighbouring countries Egypt and Tunisia in particular. Libya
now faces a dramatic period that recalls the violence of its history, including
during the Italian Fascist occupation. Since the 2011 war, Libyan society is still
characterised by reversibility: everything is done and undone; everything is built
and then falls into ruin. Everything reflects the Bedouin tent: quickly installed
for a short moment in a space that never becomes a place. Nevertheless, we
managed to collect some local Libyan data, all the more valuable in that we have
demographic data from before and after the war, which provides interesting
insights into the territorial impact of the war.
– Syria, where the civil war has been on-going since March 2011. In this atlas, the
analysis of the Syrian territory is based on data and information obtained
recently pertaining to the period prior to the civil war. The crisis that has
overwhelmed the country since 2011 has seen 4 million Syrians flee to the
neighbouring states of Iraq (0.2 million), Turkey (1.6 million), Lebanon (1.5)
and Jordan (0.9), and more than 6 million within Syria in search of a safe refuge.
As the Arab Reform Initiative states,1 the conflict has not only caused many
casualties (perhaps 300,000 to date), but also disrupted health systems that are
essential for the nation’s future, with childhood diseases such as polio resur-
facing, a number of hospitals being turned into refugee shelters, and destroyed
the economy down. The country is torn apart for decades.
Notwithstanding wars, many countries of the European neighbourhoods have
experienced huge changes in their territorial geometries over the last decades and
sometimes the last century. The attempt to delineate territories similar to Europe’s is
all the more challenging in that several neighbour countries do not beneﬁt from a
steady territorial division.
There are many examples of the difﬁculty of setting up good time series due to
these delineation changes. In Moldova, the number of rayons (departments) has
varied between 60 and 18 during the Soviet period; at the time of independence
there were 40 rayons, then during the ﬁrst years of independence three
administrative-territorial reforms took place. Approaching European standards,
Moldova returned to the pre-Soviet administrative-territorial structure of 12 coun-
ties in 1998; but in 2003 the country returned to the departmental administrative
system! Moreover, one of the two main regions of the country, Transnistria, is a
1http://www.arab-reform.net/.
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breakaway state located on a strip of land between the River Dniester and the
eastern Moldovan border with Ukraine. Since its declaration of independence in
1990, and especially after the War of Transnistria in 1992, it has been governed as
the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), a state with limited recognition.
Because of the Russian military contingent there, the European Court of Human
Rights considers Transnistria “under the effective authority or at least decisive
influence of Russia”. The territory’s political status remains unresolved: it is an
unrecognized, but independent, presidential republic with its own government,
parliament, military, police, postal system, and currency. Countless geometry
changes of this kind exist in the European neighbourhoods.
When it became independent, in 1963, Algeria had to drastically reduce the
number of communes (from 1577 to 676) to tackle the lack of competent managers
once the Europeans left. This skill shortage has to be kept in mind when trying to
understand why the South Mediterranean countries are so centralised; this is, of
course, only one of a number of explanations but, for instance, in the case of
Tunisia the choice of centralised public national bodies and delivery for water
supply or electricity was partly due to the need to concentrate the few competent
managers left in the country at the end of the French protectorate. Indeed, poor
national governance also explains geometry changes: for instance, continuous
changes have occurred in Libya, during the colonial era, under Kadhaﬁ’s rule and
since the 2011 war.
Likewise, Moroccan territorial reform in the 2000s introduced new provinces.
Due to the quality of Moroccan local data, it could be partially possible to rebuild
the data corresponding to the limits of former provinces by aggregating municipal
data. This demonstrates the importance of on-the-ground work to fully understand
the nature of the delineation changes, even when ofﬁcial names and territories’
codes remain unchanged!
Lebanon is another case. In 2003, its parliament approved the establishing of two
new governorates by splitting the governorates of the North into two, and that of
Beqaa into two as well. The corresponding application decrees were never devel-
oped and the political will to implement the administrative division is lacking. But
one fears that further research will have to cope with this coming geometry change.
The number and boundaries of Turkish provinces and districts have undergone
radical changes. The number of districts increased from 636 in 1960 to 957 in 2011.
These changes do not seem to follow a clear pattern, and it is barely possible to
track the changes. TurkStat has not published any data to allow comparisons with
previous borders.
In the former Yugoslavia, the territory, its delimitation and settlements have
been largely modiﬁed during the wars. From 1991 (secession of Slovenia from the
federation) to 2001 and even 2008, these territories went through combats, ethnic
cleansing, massive migration, ﬁnally the multiplication of new republics replacing
the former confederation with in-depth internal territorial reorganisation. For
instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after 1995, the territorial structure was
reformed according to the “Inter-Entity Boundary Line” with no continuity with the
previous situation, assigning municipalities or part of municipalities to one of the
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two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand and Republika
Srpska on the other) in accordance with their “ethnic” composition. As a result,
drawing any steady delineation was a complex process. For the ﬁrst time, and
thanks to the help of the M4D consortium,2 this atlas displays a coherent
new nomenclature for all the neighbour countries except for Croatia, the Fyrom,
Montenegro and Turkey which were granted ofﬁcial NUTS divisions as candidate
countries to the EU.
1.3.2 The Local Data Issue: Scarcely Available, Reliable
and Comparable
Problems are common to all the ﬁelds of data: access to data, change in quality of
data, data reliability in particular the expected issue of informal activity, sources’
reliability, etc.
The main problem of data reliability lies in the informal issue. The huge scale of
informal activity, income and employment is a major characteristic of the neigh-
bourhoods’ economy and thus statistics. It ranges from 20 to 50 % in the
non-agricultural sectors in Arab countries [Aita 2011]. In Egypt one can estimate
that informal economy accounts for 40 % of the economy; informal jobs have
enormously increased during the liberal 2000s decade. In Morocco, the informal
economy employs 30 % of the workforce. In Jordan the ﬁgure is about 20 % for
jobs and over 20 % for the economy. Before the uprising in Syria broke out, 25 %
of the workforce was unregulated. The ﬁgures are similar in the Western Balkans.
Over the 1990s, the ratio of the informal economy to registered GDP in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia was approximately one-third. Before they split into two
countries, the size of the shadow economy in Serbia and Montenegro was estimated
at more than one third of the GDP [Krstić and Sanfey 2010].
According to the estimate of the Russian federal state statistics service
(Goskomstat), the share of the informal economy of total GDP increased from 13 %
in 1993 to 23 % in 1996 and 25 % in 2000s. However, Goskomstat’s method has
been strongly criticized by national and international experts; their estimation is that
during the transition, the informal economy reached 23 % when the USSR col-
lapsed, 42 % in 1995 and almost 50 % in the ﬁrst half of the 2000 decade. One half
of the Russian population is employed informally as a part or the entirety of their
activity. In Ukraine, the share of employment in informal activity outside of agri-
culture in the mid-2000s was 17 %, but at the largest account, that is, including
individuals involved in agricultural production on a secondary basis or for their own
use, the ﬁgure was 66 % [Commander et al. 2013]. It seems that informal activity
accounted for around 16 % of the Ukrainian GDP in 1990, rising to 47 % in the
mid-1990s and over 50 % in the mid-2000s. Formerly, it has been estimated that the
2http://database.espon.eu/db2/.
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informal economy accounted for between 35 and 44 % of GDP in the countries of
the former Soviet Union. In this matter, things do not seem to have really changed
since then.
Another shortcoming of the neighbour countries’ statistics system is that the
national body in charge is often recently-created—the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics was created in 1994. These bodies follow international prescriptions in
terms of statistical deﬁnition and methods, but to varying degrees and since dif-
ferent years. Deﬁnitions of categories remain different from one country to another
and even when they are alike, the available data on the local scale varies. As an
example, incomes are documented in a large number of ways: in the Near East we
could only ﬁnd net incomes in Israel, daily wages in the occupied Palestinian
territory, and households’ income in Jordan. In order to make comparable series and
maps, we harmonised data by keeping the regional distribution of the data provided
for a given country, and applying it to the national value found in the same
international database selected to apply to all neighbour countries—Gross National
Income from World Bank data in that case. We acknowledge that the ﬁnal result is
an approximation, but such approximation allows comparison.
Given the challenge of the heterogeneity of the collected data, our composite
indicators are a major asset of this territorial integrated analysis of the neighbour-
hoods. The atlas set up four composite indicators:
– “Local Human Development Index” taking into account income, life expectancy
and education, in order to analyse local social disparities
– “Territorial dynamism” through the demographic evolution and the economic
evolution in the 2000s (which, by the way, means that we also had to make time
series harmonisation so as to be able to have data for 2000 and 2010 for all
countries)
– “International openness index” based on data on international ports, interna-
tional airports and presence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on a local scale,
so as to address the question of regional international integration
– “Territorial potential index” based on tertiary education, transport accessibility
and international openness.
1.3.3 The Climax of Geometries and Data Complexity: The
Israel-Palestine Puzzle
Nowhere in the neighbourhoods are these contested territories, data and mapping
more complex than in Palestine and Israel. This conflicting history has directly
impacted not only the size of “Palestine” but also its internal territorial organisation
and data production. Between 1948 and 1967, the West Bank (800,000 inhabitants)
was under the Jordanian administration and divided into 3 districts, the Gaza
Strip (300,000 inhabitants) was under the Egyptian administration and included
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5 territorial entities. Under Israeli administration between 1967 and 1994, the West
Bank was divided into 8 governorates, and the Gaza Strip into 5 governorates.
Since 1994, according to the Palestinian Authority administration, the Occupied
Palestinian territory (OPT) has consisted of two physically separated land masses,
the West Bank (5660 km2, 2.6 million inhabitants in 2011, 11 governorates
including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (360 km2, 1.6 million, 5
governorates).
The conflicted complexity of these recurrent territorial changes is increased by
settlements developed under the on-going Israeli occupation: upon the Israeli
withdrawal from the heart of the Gaza Strip in 2005, the main urban areas of Gaza
constitute a single territorial unit, with the exception of an unpopulated security
buffer zone along the northern and eastern borders of Gaza that remains under
Israeli control. But in the West Bank, Israel’s aim has been to control as much land
as possible, and this aim was marked, in 1991, by a master plan for every single
settlement. In the past two decades the Israeli settlements’ built-up areas have
increased from 69 km2 in 1990 (240,000 settlers) to 189 km2 in 2011 (179 set-
tlements, 628,000 settlers3 whereas the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics says
“531,000” people including East Jerusalem). 84 % of the Palestinian West Bank
population live in Areas A and B, whilst Area C, over which Israel has full control,
constitutes 61 % of the total West Bank but is scarcely populated with Palestinians
because of the long term restrictions imposed on any kind of Palestinian devel-
opment. In the West Bank as a whole, in addition to the 72 checkpoints, 26 partial
checkpoints, 94 road blocks, 163 earth mounds, 121 road/iron gates, 71 watch-
towers and 113 agricultural gates, Israel initiated, in 2002, its “defensive wall”.
Once completed, the wall will isolate 66 Palestinian localities (320,000 people
including 274,000 in Jerusalem), totalling 733 km2 i.e. 13 % of the total area of the
West Bank.
When it comes to the data issue, the most valuable data on population come from
the census taken by the British in 1931. The quality of Mandate statistics declined
after the 1931 census. Civil unrest, followed by World War II, made it impossible
for the British to take another census. After 1948, during the Israeli occupation, the
statistical situation deteriorated even further in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In
this atlas, directly derived from the ARIJ work, occupied Palestinian territory data
for the years 1950–1990 are taken from the Palestine remembered website,4 a
non-proﬁt organisation that gathers data from this variety of statistical sources. The
task is all the more difﬁcult in that Israel did not transfer the data to the Palestinian
Authority covering the years 1948–1994. Despite serious efforts been made by
different governmental and non-governmental institutions to generate demography
data for that period, data for the years 1991 and 1993 remains unavailable, because
of the unrest of the ﬁrst Intifada which occurred since 1987 until the Oslo
Agreements of 1993. When the Palestinian Authority took over the administration
3Source: ARIJ GIS Department 2011.
4http://www.palestineremembered.com.
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in 1994, it established the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS); data for
the years 1994–1996 are preliminary estimates published by the PCBS; the ﬁrst
census taken by the Bureau was conducted in 1997, and the second in 2007, with
reasonable reliability.
Let us now consider these data matters from the Israeli side. The occupation,
annexation of East Jerusalem and Golan Heights, and the settlement movement
emanating from the 1967 war have influenced the complex way Israel counts its
own population. The 1949 borders of Israel, known more commonly as the
pre-1967 borders, or the “Green Line,” were in effect for only 18 years, until 1967
when Israel unilaterally occupied the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Sinai
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. At the end of 2012, about 531,000 Israeli Jewish
settlers lived in the occupied West Bank (including an estimated 190,000 in East
Jerusalem); an additional 19,000 settlers reside in the annexed Golan Heights. Israel
considers its population to include all those residing within the 1967 borders, plus
all those residing in Jewish settlements in the West Bank, as well as all those (both
Jews and Palestinian-Arabs) residing in annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan
Heights. By contrast, the international community does not consider the occupied
West Bank and the Golan Heights to be part of Israel, nor does it recognise the
annexation of East Jerusalem or consider the settler population in the occupied
Palestinian territory to be part of Israel. However, speciﬁc statistical analyses made
it possible for ITAN to compare the settler population in the West Bank (not
including those in East Jerusalem) to the population in Israel’s other six districts,
something which had not been done by previous research.
Note that many Israeli maps, notably those available at schools and other state
institutions, do not show the 1967 borders (Green Line) between Israel and the
West Bank and the Golan Heights.
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